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1. Introduction
1
As stated by both the Council and the European Commission, the European Union's
actions concerning employment follow two main tracks: on the one hand, there is the
European Employment Strategy (EES), embodied in the employment title which was
incorporated into the Community Treaty at Amsterdam in 1997 and developed further at
the Extraordinary European Council in Luxembourg later in the same year. On the other
hand, many Community actions to assist employment are taken in the framework of the
Structural Funds. However, there are quite some differences between these two
instruments. Whereas for the EES there is direct and explicit link to support
employment, the involvement of the Structural Funds in the EU’s support of
employment is much less explicit. This is not only due to the fact that the Structural
Funds are much broader in scope and not only limited to support employment. It is also
due to differences between these two instruments which are more fundamental in
nature.
The  European Employment Strategy as such - that is, the so-called "Luxembourg
Process" - is one of the main fields in which the "open method of coordination" is used,
based upon policy coordination and benchmarking rather than legally-binding acts. This
"third way" in EU governance is used when harmonisation is unworkable but mutual
recognition and the resulting regulatory competition may be too risky. By adopting the
OMC in employment policy, where Member States have been hesitant to opt for EU
competence (Anderson 1995, p. 152, Gold 1993, p. 10), it seemed possible to
accommodate pressures for increased action at the EU level with contradictory pressure
against expanding EU competences (Adnet 2001, p. 359). The main instruments are -
National Action Plans (NAPs) incorporating the European employment guidelines
which are drawn up by each Member State in a multi-annual perspective. The
implementation of the NAPs is subject to a multilateral surveillance procedure, in which
recommendations are made to individual Member States. Benchmarking and peer
review processes are carried out to promote convergence and mutual learning.
                                               
1  Research for this paper has been supported by the 5
th EU research framework programme
(Contract No HPSE-CT-2001-00045). For more information about the project and economic
governance in the EU please visit the project website at www.govecor.org4
The Structural Funds, on the other hand, are embedded in the "supranational" sphere of
EU policy-making, forming part of the Community budget and giving a strong role to
the Community institutions. The funds are allocated either via the mainstream
programmes of Objective 1, 2, and 3 or via the Community Initiatives with the latter
giving the European Commission an even more influential role than the former. The
main instruments are regional or national development plans, Community Support
Frameworks,  Operational Programmes and Community Initiative Programmes.
Looking at these two instruments of an evolving European employment policy, this
paper addresses the following questions:
-  What problems are posed by the interaction between these different approaches
and instruments at the various levels at which they interact?
-  To what extent do these two approaches increasingly build upon synergies?
-  What are the prospects for a two track EU employment policy consisting of the
EES/NAPs and the Structural Funds?
The overarching research questions are whether and to what extent does the EU indeed
affect changes in national politics and polity and what are the implications for processes
of governance? In conceptual terms this study is based on the assumption that the EU is
a system of multilevel governance which reflects “a polity creating process in which
authority and policy-making influence are shared across multiple levels of government
(Hooghe and Marks 2001, p. 2). It is a widely shared view that such a system consists of
three distinct features (Marks et.al. 1996, Grande 2000, Hooghe and Marks 2002):
1.  Decision-making competencies are sheared by actors at different levels
2.  Actors and arenas are not ordered hierarchically as in traditional intergovernmental
relationships
3.  Consensual or non-majoritarian decision-making among states, which requires a
continuous wide-ranging negotiation process (Kaiser and Prange 2002).
The fundamental research puzzle is whether such a system of governance is moving
towards a fusioned or rather towards a fragmented multilevel system. In addressing5
these questions, the paper seeks to explore the policy dilemmas which European
employment policy is facing. Among students of European integration, there is little
dispute that governance beyond the national state is a fact in Europe. It includes shared
norms, routinised practices, and formalised rules and procedures which are part of the
acquis communautaire (Shaw and Wiener 2000). The questions is how to charactize and
explain it. These questions have been the focus of intensive academic research. The
answers however, vary greatly, reflecting the whole range of possible answers. A group
of researchers around Börzel and Risse assume that the EU exerts adaptive pressure to
close the gap between norms and practices of the EU and its Member States (Börzel
2002, Börzel and Risse 2000; Knill et. al. 1996)? Others like Goetz (2001-a + b) and
Nurnberg (1999) suggest a slightly less dramatic impact of the EU on national politics.
They argue that domestic reform processes are often complimentary or convergent to
EU policy processes and can therefore not be distinguished from the adaptation to EU
norms? Yet, other studies distinguish between policy and polity convergence.
Adaptation or convergence in the former does not necessarily lead to similar effects in
the later (Héritier 2001). In particular those policies where EU norms prescribe an
elaborated institutional structure for the national level, a considerable degree of
convergence between the Member States has been observed (Knill / Lehmkuhl 1999,
Radaelli 2000).
When analysing the impact of European policy making on national (and sub-national)
level, this paper will look at three dimensions of policy making, namely the legal, the
strategy formulation and the administrative dimension (Le Roy 1999, p. 388). The legal
dimension is primarily linked to and shaped by the EU level of governance and actors
involved at that level. However, in limiting the analysis not only to this level, the paper
assumes that the legal basis will not be the “basis of all actors’ behavior” as Garret and
Tsebelis argue (2001, p. 356). Instead the legal basis will provide an initial basis for the
other two, informal dimensions of EU governance. They may be mutually reinforcing in
the EU or they may not. The latter two dimensions, i.e. strategy formulation and
administrative dimension, have largely been interpreted as the result of “the ’pressures
for convergence’ coming from above” (De La Porte, Pochet and Room 2001, p. 302;
Biagi 2000, p. 159). Convergence at these two dimensions of policy making are the6
result of policy learning and policy coordination at all levels of EU governance
(Philippart 2002, Girerd 2002).
2. The Legal Bases for the Two Tracks: No Clear Arrangements
The concept of integration through law has long dominated studies on European
integration (Laffan 2001, p. 722). Some more recent studies understood EC legal norms
not only as a body of texts but included the routinization of practices, institutionalisation
of principles, and social norms (Shaw and Wiener 2000). In order to identify clearly the
level of fusion/fragmentation, the following understands legal norms in a more limited
sense of primary and secondary legislation. Norms and practices will be analysed
separately.
The Amsterdam Treaty does not clearly provide for a two track approach to
employment, inasmuch as neither the employment title nor the provisions governing
cohesion policy include any explicit reference to the other. Implicitly, of course, the
Treaty does include a linkage. Article 3 TEC includes as Community competences the
coordination of employment policy to reach a high level of employment and social
policy pursued by the European Social Fund (ESF), and Article 127 TEC stipulates that
all Community policies should contribute to the objectives formulated in the framework
of the EES. Secondary legislation on ESF is more explicit. Article 1 of the ESF
Regulation specifies that "the Fund shall contribute to the actions undertaken in
pursuance of the European Employment Strategy and the Annual Guidelines on
Employment". At the same time, Article 2, however, outlines a much broader field of
intervention than the EES pillars allowing Member States to use the ESF outside the
four EES pillars and guidelines. It can therefore be assumed that when the European
Parliament and the Council adopted the ESF regulation in July 1999 they deliberately
left the choice to the Member States to decide whether they want to put their entire ESF
allocation on the four EES pillars, namely employability, entrepreneurship, adaptability,
and equal opportunities or whether they want to pursue national employment policy
objectives as well.7
With regard to the legal bases, therefore, the relationship between the two approaches is
ambiguous. It does not include a clear mandate to the Member States, nor a division of
tasks or outline procedures to be followed. This is perhaps inevitable to the extent that
the Luxembourg process is not implemented through legal acts but by instruments
which are not legally binding. This lack of legal clarity as to how the implementation of
the two tracks should be coordinated leaves the authorities involved in the two
processes with considerable flexibility.
3. The Strategic level: Synergies or Patchwork?
Different issues arise with regard to coordination of the two approaches at the strategic
level.
Coordination was in all events delayed by the difference in the timing of the two policy
cycles. The Structural Funds cycle follows a multi-annual programming period. The
previous period ran from 1994 to 1999. Since the EES only began to be implemented in
1998, no meaningful coordination with the Structural Funds could be expected at first.
Only a few adjustments were then made to accommodate EES objectives by, for
example, reallocating funds towards preventive actions (European Commission 2000-b,
p. 81). It was only for the current programming period 2000-2006, the Structural Funds
could be expected to play a strategic role in supporting the objectives of the EES. The
European Commission, the Council and the individual Member States, however, seem
to follow different approaches when it comes to linking the EES and NAPs with the
ESF.
The European Commission has clearly considered it necessary that the EES and the ESF
priorities should be coordinated. This coordination should extend to all Structural Funds
procedures, namely the so-called mainstream programmes of the Objectives 1, 2, and 3,
to the Community Initiatives (CI), and to the Innovative actions. The following will
analyse how strategic coordinations has evolved in the first two procedures which
combine 99% of the funds.8
In its guidelines for the 2000-2006 programmes, the Commission indicated that "plans,
drawn up on the basis of common Employment Guidelines adopted by the Council, will
serve as the overall framework for measures to support employment policies under the
Structural Funds" (European Commission 1999-a, p. 2). The ESF was given a more
pronounced role than the other Structural Funds: "The ESF is the main financial
instrument at EU level for helping the Member States develop and implement the
employment guidelines under the European employment strategy" (European
Commission 1999-a, p.22).
The Commission has stressed that this coordination should be reflected not only at the
strategic level but also in implementation: the monitoring procedures and, in particular,
the evaluations should assess the degree of consistency between the ESF and the NAPs
(European Commission 1999-b, p. 10). The Commission’s policy statements on
implementation of the Structural Funds which refer to the NAPs often take the form of
guidelines. Although these are not legally binding, the Commission is nevertheless
concerned that they should be followed by the Member States to the greatest possible
extent. In its first assessment of the programming process for Objective 1
2, the
Commission comes to an overall positive conclusion about the Member States’
willingness to follow its guidelines. In some cases, such as Sweden, Finland, Germany,
Ireland, and the UK, the Commission concluded that the guidelines had been fully taken
into account, i.e. including the employment policy provisions (European Commission
2001-b, p. 12).
Even stronger links between the ESF and the EES establishes the Community Initiative
EQUAL. However, compared to the mainstream Structural Funds programmes, the CIs
receive a relatively modest share with some 4% of the funds. Although CI are therefore
financially far less important than the Objectives 1, 2, and 3, many of the strategic
priorities of former CIs have been incorporated into the new generation of the
mainstream programmes and consequently now benefit from considerable amount of
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funding.
3 In terms of procedure, CIs differ from the mainstream programme because of
a much more influential role of the Commission. Namely it is the Commission and not
the Member State which determines the thematic priorities. In the case of EQUAL, they
almost entirely reflect the EES. “EQUAL will operate in a number of thematic fields,
defined in the context of the four pillars of the employment strategy..” (European
Commission 2000-a, p. 3). In addition to the four pillars of the EES, EQUAL also aims
to contribute to the objectives outlined in the EU strategy to combat discrimination and
social exclusion.
Unlike the Commission which mostly favours a strong linkage between ESF and EES,
4
the Council followed an ambiguous approach. Whereas the Council Resolution on the
1998 Employment Guidelines does not include any reference to the Structural Funds,
the Resolution and Decision on the Guidelines for 1999 and 2000 do refer to the
positive contribution of the ESF to the EES. The decision on the Guidelines for 2001
goes even further in that they also mention the other Structural Funds and not only the
ESF. One year later the situation has changed again, however, and the decision on the
2002 Guidelines does not include any reference to the Structural Funds (Council of the
EU 2002-a). This lower importance attached to the Structural Funds in 2002 could be
attributed to the fact that the negotiations of the Structural Funds programming
documents were at their height in 2000 and 2001. Consequently, the Council was
acutely aware of the close links of the Structural Funds with the EES not least because
the Commission strongly urged for linking the Structural Funds programming
documents to the EES. In 2002, however, these documents had already been adopted
and it was then up to the Member States to implement them.
                                               
3  In fact, one of the fundamental objectives of CI is, as defined by the European Commission, to test
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The successful approaches should then be incorporated into the Objective 1, 2, and 3 programmes
and the NAPs. European Commission, Communication establishing the guidelines for the
Community Initiative EQUAL concerning transnational co-operation to promote new means of
combating all forms of discrimination and inequalities in connection with the labour market, COM
853, Brussels 14.4.2000, p. 4 and 7.
4  However, recent statements of Commission officials from DG Economic and Financial Affairs
suggest a different approach. However, this seems not to be the official policy of the Commission
since DG Emploi continues to refer to the ESF as the major financial instrument of the EU
underpinning the EES.10
This apparent reluctance on the part of the Council to link ESF and NAPs became again
clear at the Barcelona European Council. The Heads of State or Government recognised
the difficulties caused by the different calendars of the Broad Economic Policy
Guidelines and the annual employment package, and consequently agreed that the
processes should be synchronised in the future (European Commission 2002-a). Similar
problems of timing exist between the EES and the ESF, since the preparation of the
NAPs is not consistent with the ESF annual financial planning (European Court of
Auditors 2001, p. 4). Member States are not informed of the new Guidelines and
Council Recommendations for the coming year until November of the current year. This
l e a v e s  t h e m  w i t h  v e r y  l i t t l e  t i m e  ( o n l y  f r o m  N o v e m b e r  t o  J a n u a r y )  t o  a d a p t  E S F
interventions if necessary to these recommendations. The European Council so far did
not address this problem.
When looking at the level of the individual Member State, they have implemented the
requirement to link the ESF and the EES. But they seem to do this in a rather formal
than strategic way. They also do not distinguish between mainstream programmes and
the EQUAL programme. The first NAPs were adopted in 1998. Since only the
Luxembourg European Council of November 1997 established the NAP process, the
1998 NAPs were drafted in a great haste. Although more time was available for the
NAP 1999, the link with the ESF was still quite weak because the Funds were
programmed until the end of 1999. However, with the new programming period starting
in 2000, Member States could make the link between the two tracks of the European
employment policy more explicit. Over time the NAPs show a growing linkage with the
ESF. In fact, all NAPs for the year 2002 include information on how the ESF is used to
support the EES. Also most of the programming documents adopted for EQUAL
include an explicit reference to the NAPs. The CIP for GB goes beyond that of the other
Member States because it does not only include references to the UK NAP but it also
outlines how its EQUAL programme responds the Council recommendations to Ireland
and to observations made in the Joint Employment Report with view to implementing
the NAP.11
The Commission critically remarked that the descriptions of ESF operations are
particularly weak with regard to innovative approaches or to specific regional or
sectoral problems. In a way, the descriptions of ESF operations provided in the NAPs
sometimes seem to be somewhat detached from the Employment Strategy (apart from
the formal links between policy fields and Pillars) and do not make it easy to specify the
genuine activating or innovative contribution of the ESF. Also the link with other
Structural Funds such as the ERDF is hardly spelled out.
An analysis of the allocation of Funds within the mainstream programmes and EQUAL
do not seem to support this criticism. Under the mainstream programme of Objective 1
and 3 the ESF is allocated quite unevenly to the four pillars of the EES (European
Commission 2001-a, p. 2). The largest share is spent under the employability pillar
(around 60% of the ESF budget or Euro 34 billion) followed by the adaptability pillar
(Euro 11 billion), entrepreneurship (Euro 8 billion) and equal opportunities (Euro 4
billion).
5 The total amount allocated to the four pillars corresponds to 35% of all ESF
spending allocated under the two Objectives. Although there are large variations
between Objective 1 and Objective 3 programmes as well as between the Member
States
6, these figures suggest a major role for the ESF in supporting the EES objectives.
The figures also allow to conclude that the Member States are indeed linking the ESF
funds to the EES. As regards national co-financing instruments, most Member States
confined their reporting to the ESF closely following the structures (priorities, sub-
priorities, and measures) of the OPs. It would however be premature to conclude that
the ESF has been established as a major component for the implementation of the NAPs
because the information provided does not give any indication as to the strategic and
managerial coordination between NAPs and the ESF programmes.
As for the Community Initiative EQUAL, the Member States’ funding schemes follow
those of the mainstream programmes. However, the funds are spread much more evenly
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(more than 50%) and relatively limited emphasis on employability (a little more than 20%), France
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employability pillar. Overall, the employability pillar receives a lower share of funds in Objective
1 programmes than in Objective 3 programmes.12
over the four pillars than it is the case in the mainstream programmes: 36% of the funds
are spent for employability, followed by 26% for adaptability, 18% for entrepreneuship
and 16% for the equal opportunity pillar
7. When comparing the allocation of individual
Member States under EQUAL and mainstream programme Objective 1 and 3, some
striking differences can be noted. Firstly, none of the Member States have allocated the
same share of ESF funds to the four pillars under EQUAL and the mainstream
programmes. Finland, in fact, is the only Member State which mostly allocated the same
share of ESF funds under the EQUAL and the mainstream scheme to the four pillars.
All other Member States show partly large differences between the four pillars.
Secondly, the share allocated to employability pillar is much smaller under the EQUAL
scheme than under the mainstream programmes. For all Member States the difference is
in average between 20-30% with peak differences occurring for the Netherlands (with
more than 50% difference) France (more than 40% difference) under Objective 1.
Thirdly, all Member States with the exception of Germany, Greece, Ireland, and
Sweden have allocated a smaller ESF share to the fourth pillar of the EES, i.e. equal
opportunities. The largest difference occurs for Spain (with 28% more under the
EQUAL scheme), the Netherlands (19%), and Luxembourg (with 17% difference)
8.
Interviews conducted in the framework of the Govecor research project suggest that
these difference in allocation of funds are at least partly motivated by the different
programme requirements itself. EQUAL allows for more flexible procedures and
encourages Member States to test innovative approaches. Overall the mainstream
programmes rather rely on stricter and more conservative procedures. The EES pillars
and the guidelines such as concepts of lifelong learning or active ageing are perceived to
require innovative approaches rather than ‘old-fashioned’ training measures which are
still the dominant ESF activity under the mainstream programmes. These findings point
to some degree of inconsistency between policy objectives as outlined in the EES and
the corresponding instruments and procedures.
                                               
7  The remaining 4% of EQUAL funds are allocated to social and professional integration of asylum
seekers, a priority identified by the EU strategy to combat exclusion.
8  For an overview of the individual country allocation, see Annex 2.13
As another explanation for this difference could the fact that the drafting process of the
CSF and OPs of Objective 1 and 3 usually involve a wide range of ministries and
regional authorities. For Objective 1, the Ministry of Employment usually plays a less
prominent role than e.g. the Ministry of Economic Affairs. In some cases such as
Germany or the UK the regional and local level play a major role in drafting the
programme and thus deciding on the allocation of funds. Although it has been reported
that the national authorities inform sub-national level of the EES guidelines and Council
recommendations on implementing the NAP, the findings suggest that other
considerations prevail in drafting the programming documents.
For Objective 3 the Ministry of Employment is usually the major actor involved in the
drafting. Although it can be observed that the programming documents often include an
explicit reference to the NAPs, drafting the document still involves considerable input
from other ministries. So even if it can be assumed that the Ministry of Employment is
prepared to better reflect the EES guidelines in the programming documents and
allocation of funds, the coordination may lead to compromises which do not necessarily
take into account the EES priorities but reflect the result of long bargaining process
within the Member State. These frictions do not occur in the programming process of
EQUAL because it is much more orchestrated by the Ministry of Employment with very
limited input from other Ministries or the sub-national level.
Another explanation for this inconsistency could be the fact that the Commission is a
more powerful player under EQUAL than under the mainstream programme. The
Member States can allocate the funds only to those priorities identified by the
Commission. For the mainstream programmes, the Member States or the regions
determine the priorities. Therefore, it can be assumed that the EQUAL allocation of
funds is not entirely the result of national priorities but also Commission priorities.
4. The Administrative Level: Blurred Competences or Targeted Networking?
Similar to the strategic vision over time the managerial level shows has developed more
linkages between the two tracks of EU employment policy. However, here again it is the14
Commission which seems to be the actor most eager to bridge the gap between the two
tracks. For example, whereas the Council had seen the role of the Employment
Committee as ensuring consistency between the Employment Guidelines and the Broad
Economic Policy Guidelines - the Structural Funds were not mentioned - the
Commission has tried to extend these tasks (Council of the EU 2000, Art. 1).
Implementation of the two lines of action has demanded considerable adaptation and
flexibility on the part of the Member States’ authorities. Due to the management
structure which had been established for the Structural Funds, considerable attention
needed to be paid to inter-ministerial coordination. As for the Objective 1 regions, in
none of the Member States is the managing authority for the Community Support
Framework (CSF) situated in the Ministry of Employment or Labour. This
responsibility is usually given to the Ministry of Finance, of Planning or of Economic
Affairs. Thus, inter-ministerial coordination between the managing authority and the
department in charge of the ESF at the Ministry of Labour became necessary in order to
coordinate the implementation of the ESF-related aspects of the CSF and the NAPs
under Objective 1. Furthermore, it seems that responsibility for supervising the
implementation of the NAPs does not so far rest with the same department which has
responsibility for the ESF. An equally segmented situation occurs at the level of
Operational Programmes (OPs). In the case of regional OPs (ROPs) the main
responsibility for drafting and managing the ROPs is usually not allocated to the
Ministry of Labour but to the Ministry of Economic Affairs. On the other hand, when it
comes to sectoral OPs (SOPs) on human resource development, where the ESF is the
dominant Fund in terms of finances, the managing authority is indeed mostly located in
the Ministry of Employment or Labour.
Again the situation is different for the Community Initiative EQUAL. At European
level, the Commission has established a management structure supporting a close link
between NAP and EQUAL. First, it has set up an evaluation mechanism geared to
assess the implications of EQUAL for the EES. Second, a database of good practice has
been developed which can be used for periodic assessment of the actual and potential
impact of EQUAL on the NAP. Third, in the framework of action 3 of EQUAL15
“Thematic networking, dissemination of good practice and making an impact on
national policy” Member States are required to establish mechanisms facilitating
mainstreaming at both the horizontal and the vertical level, including the NAP
(European Commission 2000-a, p. 10).
The Member States for their part followed these guidelines in different ways. Whereas
some States establish a very close linkage with the NAP and their EQUAL programme,
others hardly refer to it at all. For instance Germany explicitly stipulates in its CIP that
the programme’s strategic priorities and implementation structures are based on the
NAP. One of the key elements identified under action of the German CIP is to examine
how far EQUAL, the NAP and the EES complement one another.
So far we have looked at linkages between Structural Funds and the EES which are
initiated by the Structural Funds requirements. We could also expect growing links
initiated from the EES. For instance drafting of the NAPs has required coordination
between different ministries. In Sweden, for instance, the Ministry of Employment and
Communication shared this task with the Ministry of Industry and the Ministry of
Finance, where one official is responsible at each ministry. In most cases, the main
responsibility rests with the Ministry of Employment. At first sight, this situation would
seem to allow for meaningful coordination in implementing NAPs and SOPs on human
resource development. However, interviews conducted in selected Member States
suggest that  responsibility for supervising implementation of the NAPs usually does
not rest in the same department as the Managing Authority for the SOP. Few Member
States have reported overlapping management responsibilities for both the NAPs and
the ESF.
This fragmentation of the management structure of the ESF and the NAPs is also
reflected in the new "programme complements" of the mainstream programmes
9.
Although the SOPs and ROPs refer to how to contribute to the EES’s objectives, the
programme complements show a different picture. Overall, the references to the EES
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can be grouped into two types. They either aim at achieving material compatibility
between ESF interventions and NAPs, or they outline how to achieve and verify the
achievement of the quantified objectives laid down in the NAPs. They do not refer to
administrative coordination between the authorities involved in these two instruments.
Given the purpose of the programme complement, which includes an overview of the
administrative structure for managing Structural Funds, this failure to refer to
coordination with NAPs suggests that Member States indeed interpret the  two track
implementation rather narrowly. Coordination seems to be accepted in terms of defining
strategic objectives and the control of achieving them. Indeed, both the programming
documents as well as interviews suggest that a major link between the Structural Funds
process and the EES is the monitoring and evaluation process. Since evaluation is a new
element for most of the Member States public administrations, only introduced with the
Structural Funds, its structure follows almost entirely EU requirements. The data
collection for Structural Funds and EES therefore increasingly applies similar
procedures. Consequently many Member States e.g. Austria, Ireland, Germany report
that they interchange data for evaluating Structural Funds and the implementation of the
NAP.
Overall, however, Member States currently do not seem to accept a joint strategic or
management structure for EES and ESF or the Structural Funds in general. A notable
exception to this observation is Belgium, which has created an institution specifically
designed to coordinate implementation of the ESF and the NAP: the ESF Impact
Assessment Cell (ENIAC). Created on the initiative of the Commission and financed by
the ESF, it aims to ensure coherence between the NAPs and the ESF, to develop
indicators both for NAPs and OPs and to develop a methodology for evaluating the
impact of the ESF on the NAP.
It does not come as a surprise that the Commission is very critical about this
compartmental way of implementation: the "new round of ESF programmes have
shown that in most Member States there has been little cross-fertilisation between the
national authorities responsible for the preparation of the NAPs and those managing the
ESF interventions" (European Commission 2000-b, 73). It is "not enough for ESF17
programmes to incorporate the priorities of the EES if National Action Plans fail to fully
integrate the contribution of ESF and other Structural Funds to the EES" (European
Commission 2001-a, p. 14). The Court of Auditors is more explicit in its criticism, and
calls on the Member States to improve coordination between ERDF/ESF on the one
hand and EES/NAPs on the other (European Court of Auditors 2001, p. 6).
In addition to the new demands posed for inter-ministerial coordination, questions arise
with view to interpreting the partnership principle, that is, the involvement of a broad
range of actors in the Structural Funds cycle. Having been introduced as one of the
fundamental principles in the Structural Funds in 1988, it has gradually been extended
to regional and local authorities, social partners and representatives of civil society. On
the one hand the NAP process has so far not featured such a broad notion of partnership
with view to regional and local actors. On the other hand some Member States such as
Germany, extensively involves the economic and social partners with view to certain
EES guidelines. Their involvement in the Structural Funds implementation has in the
case of Germany often been criticised. The Council acknowledges the importance of the
local dimension in its recommendations for Member States’ employment policies:
"local action for employment significantly contributes to the achievement of the
objectives of the EES… The establishment of partnerships at all appropriate levels is
crucial" (Council of the EU 2002-b, preamble, points 18 + 19) In this respect, the
territorial employment pacts (TEPs) are geared to strengthen the local dimension of
employment and establish “strategic partnership approaches" (European Commission
2001-c, p. 8).
5. Prospects for Incremental Synergies or Growing Fragementation
Much remains to be done before the Luxembourg Process and the Structural Funds can
be considered to constitute one coordinated employment strategy for the European
Union.
Synergies are most developed and accepted by the relevant political actors at the
strategic level. The Commission consistently emphasises the link between the two18
policy approaches, and the Member States seem also to be willing to do so, albeit to a
much lesser extent.
The legal level reveals an ambivalent situation. The Treaty does not stipulate any clear
link between the two approaches. There is only a vague link made between the
Structural Funds regulations and the EES. The strongest link between ESF and EES
exists in the framework of the EQUAL programme which, however, is in financial
terms one of the weakest Structural Funds programmes. And Council documents have
been inconsistent over time.
At the administrative level, finally, there is a high degree of uncertainty in all Member
States and a variety of coordination problems can be identified.
When attempting to address the questions of prospects for future development, some of
the structural reasons for this limited synergies should be highlighted.
One obstacle to the development of greater synergy and formal links seems to be
different timing. While the EES works on an annual basis, the Structural Funds operate
according to a multi-annual scheme with programmes covering the entire programming
period of seven years. It seems that this has led to the perception that the EES and the
NAPs focus on relatively short-term interventions in contrast to Structural Funds
programmes, which are often based on longer-term strategies and priorities. This in turn
deepened the understanding that the EES and the Structural Funds are two distinct
processes which have common overall policy objectives but are not compatible in view
of the management structures.
There is also another very simple and obvious fact that constitutes an obstacle to further
links, namely that all Member States had an employment policy before the EES.
Consequently, there was no need to create new structures due to the EES but the EES
policy objectives could be incorporated into the national ones. In many Member States,
the previously existing links between employment policy – now modulated on the basis
of the EES – and the Structural Funds have therefore simply remained unchanged.19
However, in areas where new procedures had to be put in place, e.g. with view to
monitoring and evaluation, we can indeed observe managerial linkages between
Structural Funds and NAPs.
What we have indeed been able to observe were, first of all, spill-overs when it comes
to the strategy formation of the two processes and, secondly, functional fusion when it
comes to their administrative dimension. In both processes, informal procedures form a
major managerial tool. These informal parts of the managerial side tend to build on
incremental synergies between NAPs and EES. This functional spill-over is also
reflected at the level of language. The four pillars of the EES are increasingly used both
in Structural Funds programming documents and in national policy discourse.
In conclusion, the question of whether the EU is moving towards a fusioned or
fragmented system of governance in this particular policy field, based on the EES/NAPs
on the one hand and on the Structural Funds on the other remains open. Although policy
changes seem to be increasingly accepted. Yet, these changes do not go hand in hand
with corresponding polity changes where adaptations to the new design of employment
policy consisting of the two tracks EES on the one hand and Structural Funds on the
other remain limited and are more pronounced in the latter track. In addition findings
confirm that the adaptation on the Member States’ polity is stronger in those countries
which are close to the administrative design set out in Commission guidelines. But
convergence pressure is also felt by other Member States with them reacting mostly at
policy and not at polity level. In line with neo-institutional theory this findings point to
the incremental nature of institutional change (Krasner 1988, p. 83). The EES was only
introduced four years ago whereas the Structural Funds, as they operate now, have been
in place since 1988. Their procedures are much more known and enshrined in national
policy making. Establishing or adapting the institutional structure to link them with the
EES and the NAP process will not only require more time but, as neo-institutional
theory has pointed out, a change in the actors or their relative powers (Pollack 1996, p.
438, Thelen and Steinmo 1992, p. 17). This change in power balance could be achieved
by setting a clear political mandate based on EU rules. Currently, the Commission is
trying, to a certain extent, to arrive at this, but without the full backing of the Council.20
As long as the EU requirements remain unclear, the prospects for incremental synergies
or growing fragmentation will depend on the Member States’ preparedness or
reluctance to endorse the concept of a two-track employment policy of the EU.21
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